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[NOTE: This case has been edited for classroom use by the omission of text, citations, and footnotes. See this alternate source for the full opinion.]
Circuit Judge Garth
This appeal "presents a conflict between one of society's most cherished rights -- freedom of expression-- and one of the government's most profound obligations -- the protection of minors." American Booksellers v. Webb, 919 F.2d 1493, 1495 (11th Cir. 1990). The government challenges the District Court's issuance of a preliminary injunction which prevents the enforcement of the Child Online Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (1998) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 231) ("COPA"), enacted in October of 1998. At issue is COPA's constitutionality, a statute designed to protect minors from "harmful material" measured by "contemporary community standards" knowingly posted on the World Wide Web ("Web") for commercial purposes.
We will affirm the District Court's grant of a preliminary injunction because we are confident that the ACLU's attack on COPA's constitutionality is likely to succeed on the merits. Because material posted on the Web is accessible by all Internet users worldwide, and because current technology does not permit a Web publisher to restrict access to its site based on the geographic locale of each particular Internet user, COPA essentially requires that every Web publisher subject to the statute abide by the most restrictive and conservative state's community standards in order to avoid criminal liability. Thus, because the standard by which COPA gauges whether material is "harmful to minors" is based on identifying"contemporary community standards" the inability of Web publishers to restrict access to their Web sites based on the geographic locale of the site visitor, in and of itself, imposes an impermissible burden on constitutionally protected First Amendment speech.
In affirming the District Court, we are forced to recognize that, at present, due to technological limitations, there may be no other means by which harmful material on the Web may be constitutionally restricted, although, in light of rapidly developing technological advances, what may now be impossible to regulate constitutionally may, in the not-too-distant future, become feasible.
COPA was enacted into law on October 21, 1998. Commercial Web publishers subject to the statute that distribute material that is harmful to minors are required under COPA to ensure that minors do not access the harmful material on their Web site. COPA is Congress's second attempt to regulate the dissemination to minors of indecent material on the Web/Internet. The Supreme Court had earlier, on First Amendment grounds, struck down Congress's first endeavor, the Communications Decency Act, ("CDA") which it passed as part of the Telecommunications Act of 1996.n2 See ACLU v. Reno, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) ("Reno II"). To best understand the current challenge to COPA, it is necessary for us to briefly examine the CDA.
The CDA prohibited Internet users from using the Internet to communicate material that, under contemporary community standards, would be deemed patently offensive to minors under the age of eighteen. . . . In holding that the CDA violated the First Amendment, the Supreme Court explained that without defining key terms the statute was unconstitutionally vague. Moreover, the Court noted that the breadth of the CDA was "wholly unprecedented" in that, for example, it was "not limited to commercial speech or commercial entities . . . [but rather] [i]ts open-ended prohibitions embrace all nonprofit entities and individuals posting indecent messages or displaying them on their own computers." Id. at 877.
Further, the Court explained that, as applied to the Internet, a community standards criterion would effectively mean that because all Internet communication is made available to a worldwide audience, the content of the conveyed message will be judged by the standards of the community most likely to be offended by the content. . . . As a result, the Court held that the CDA was not tailored so narrowly as to achieve the government's compelling interest in protecting minors, and that it lacked the precision that the First Amendment requires when a statute regulates the content of speech.
COPA, the present statute, attempts to "address[ ] the specific concerns raised by the Supreme Court" in invalidating the CDA. H.R. REP. NO . 105-775 at 12 (1998); See S.R. REP. NO. 105-225, at 2 (1998). COPA prohibits an individual or entity from:
knowingly and with knowledge of the character of the material, in interstate or foreign commerce by means of the World Wide Web, mak[ing] any communication for commercial purposes that is available to any minor and that includes any material that is harmful to minors.47 U.S.C. § 231(a)(1) (emphasis added). As part of its attempt to cure the constitutional defects found in the CDA, Congress sought to define most of COPA's key terms. COPA attempts, for example, to restrict its scope to material on the Web rather than on the Internet as a whole; to target only those Web communications made for "commercial purposes"; and to limit its scope to only that material deemed "harmful to minors."
Under COPA, whether material published on the Web is "harmful to minors" is governed by a three-part test, each of which must be found before liability can attach:n6
(A) the average person, applying contemporary community standards, would find, taking the material as a whole and with respect to minors, is designed to appeal to, or is designed to pander to, the prurient interest;47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(6) (emphasis added).n7 The parties conceded at oral argument that this "contemporary community standards" test applies to those communities within the United States, and not to foreign communities. Therefore, the more liberal community standards of Amsterdam or the more restrictive community standards of Tehran would not impact upon the analysis of whether material is "harmful to minors" under COPA.
COPA also provides Web publishers subject to the statute with affirmative defenses. If a Web publisher"has restricted access by minors to material that is harmful to minors" through the use of a "credit card, debit account, adult access code, or adult personal identification number . . . a digital certificate that verifies age . . . or by any other reasonable measures that are feasible under available technology," then no liability will attach to the Web publisher even if a minor should nevertheless gain access to restricted material under COPA. 47 U.S.C. § 231(c)(1).n8 COPA violators face both criminal (maximum fines of $50,000 and a maximum prison term of six months, or both) and civil (fines of up to $50,000 for each day of violation) penalties.n9
. . . .
D. Procedural History
On October 22, 1998, the day after COPA was enacted, the American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU") brought the present action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, challenging COPA's constitutionality and seeking to enjoin its enforcement. After granting a temporary restraining order against enforcement of the law on November 20, 1998, the District Court held extensive evidentiary hearings which, on February 1, 1999, resulted in the entry of a preliminary injunction preventing the government from enforcing COPA.
E. District Court's Findings of Fact
. . . [N]one of the parties dispute the District Court's findings (including those describing the Internet and the Web), nor are any challenged as clearly erroneous. Thus, we accept these findings.
The District Court first rendered findings concerning the physical medium known as the Internet, which it recognized consisted of many different methods of communication, only one of which is the World Wide Web. It found that "[o]nce a provider posts its content on the Internet and chooses to make it available to all, it generally cannot prevent that content from entering any geographical community." Reno III, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 482-83.
The Court then made findings as to the costs and burdens COPA imposes on Web publishers and on the adults who seek access to sites covered by COPA. As observed earlier, the statute provides for a limited number of defenses for Web publishers. The Court found that as a technological matter the only affirmative defenses presently available are the implementation of credit card or age verification systems because there is no currently functional digital certificate or other reasonable means to verify age.
. . . .Either system, according to the District Court, would impose significant residual or indirect burdens upon Web publishers. . . .
Finally, the District Court considered whether voluntary parental blocking or filtering software was a less restrictive means by which to achieve the government's compelling objective of protecting minors from harmful material on the Web. The court found that "[s]uch technology may be downloaded and installed on a user's home computer at a price of approximately $40.00." Id. at 492 ¶ 65. The court, however, acknowledged that such software "is not perfect" as it is both over and under inclusive in the breadth of the material that it blocks and filters. See id. ¶ 66.n16
F. District Court's Conclusions of Law
. . . .
The District Court interpreted COPA to impose liability on those Web publishers who profited from Web sites that contained some, even though not all, material that was harmful to minors. The court therefore concluded that the plaintiffs could reasonably fear prosecution because their Web sites contained material "that is sexual in nature." Reno III, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 480.
Having established plaintiffs' standing -- an analysis with which we agree -- the District Court began its First Amendment analysis by stating that insofar as COPA prohibits Web publishers from posting material that is "harmful to minors," it constitutes a content-based restriction on speech that "is presumptively invalid and is subject to strict scrutiny." Id. at 493. Pursuant to this strict scrutiny analysis, the District Court held that COPA placed too large a burden on protected expression. In particular, the court found that the high economic costs that Web publishers would incur in implementing an age verification system would cause them to cease publishing such material, and further, that the difficulty in accurately shielding harmful material from minors would lead Web publishers to censor more material than necessary. Moreover, the District Court believed that because of the need to use age verification systems, adults would be deterred from accessing these sites, and that the resulting loss of Web traffic would affect the Web publishers' abilities to continue providing such communications in the future.
The court then considered whether the government could establish that COPA was the least restrictive and most narrowly tailored means to achieve its compelling objective. . . .The court concluded  that even if COPA were enforced, children would still be able to access numerous foreign Web sites containing harmful material; that some minors legitimately possess credit cards -- thus defeating the effectiveness of this affirmative defense in restricting access by minors; that COPA prohibits a "sweeping category of form of content" instead of limiting its coverage to pictures, images and graphic image files -- most often utilized by the adult industry as "teasers"Reno III, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 497; and that parental blocking and filtering technology would likely be as effective as COPA while imposing fewer constitutional burdens on free speech. Therefore, the District Court concluded that COPA was not the least restrictive means for the government to achieve its compelling objective of protecting minors from harmful material. As a result, the court held that the ACLU had shown a substantial likelihood of succeeding on the merits in establishing COPA's unconstitutionality.
In concluding its analysis, the District Court held that losing First Amendment freedoms, even if only for a moment, constitutes irreparable harm. And, in balancing the interests at stake for issuing a preliminary injunction, the District Court concluded that the scale tipped in favor of the ACLU, as the government lacks an interest in enforcing an unconstitutional law. Because the ACLU met its burden for a preliminary injunction, the District Court granted its petition.
In determining whether a preliminary injunction is warranted, we must consider:
(1) whether the movant has shown a reasonable probability of success on the merits; (2) whether the movant will be irreparably harmed by denial of the relief; (3) whether granting preliminary relief will result in even greater harm to the nonmoving party; and (4) whether granting the preliminary relief will be in the public interest.Allegheny Energy, Inc. v. DQE, Inc., 171 F.3d 153, 158 (3d Cir. 1999). We review a district court's grant of a preliminary injunction according to a three-part standard. Legal conclusions are reviewed de novo, findings of fact are reviewed for clear error, and the "ultimate decision to grant or deny the preliminary injunction" is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
A. Reasonable probability of success on the merits
We begin our analysis by considering what, for this case, is the most significant prong of the preliminary injunction test -- whether the ACLU met its burden of establishing a reasonable probability of succeeding on the merits in proving that COPA trenches upon the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. Initially, we note that the District Court correctly determined that as a content-based restriction on speech, COPA is "both presumptively invalid and subject to strict scrutiny analysis." See Reno III, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 493. As in all areas of constitutional strict scrutiny jurisprudence, the government must establish that the challenged statute is narrowly tailored to meet a compelling state interest, and that it seeks to protect its interest in a manner that is the least restrictive of protected speech.n18 . . . .
It is undisputed that the government has a compelling interest in protecting children from material that is harmful to them, even if not obscene by adult standards. At issue is whether, in achieving this compelling objective, Congress has articulated a constitutionally permissible means to achieve its objective without curtailing the protected free speech rights of adults. As we have observed, the District Court found that it had not -- holding that COPA was not likely to succeed in surviving strict scrutiny analysis.
We base our particular determination of COPA's likely unconstitutionality, however, on COPA's reliance on "contemporary community standards" in the context of the electronic medium of the Web to identify material that is harmful to minors. The overbreadth of COPA's definition of "harmful to minors" applying a "contemporary community standards" clause -- although virtually ignored by the parties and the amicus in their respective briefs but raised by us at oral argument -- so concerns us that we are persuaded that this aspect of COPA, without reference to its other provisions, must lead inexorably to a holding of a likelihood of unconstitutionality of the entire COPA statute. Hence we base our opinion entirely on the basis of the likely unconstitutionality of this clause, even though the District Court relied on numerous other grounds.n19
As previously noted, in passing COPA, Congress attempted to resolve all of the problems raised by the Supreme Court in striking down the CDA as unconstitutional. One concern noted by the Supreme Court was that, as a part of the wholly unprecedented broad coverage of the CDA, "the 'community standards' criterion as applied to the Internet means that any communication available to a nationwide audience will be judged by the standards of the community most likely to be offended by the message."Reno II, 521 U.S. at 877-78. We are not persuaded that the Supreme Court's concern with respect to the "community standards" criterion has been sufficiently remedied by Congress in COPA.
Previously, in addressing the mailing of unsolicited sexually explicit material in violation of a California obscenity statute, the Supreme Court held that the fact- finder must determine whether " 'the average person, applying contemporary community standards' wouldfind the work taken as a whole, [to appeal] to the prurient interest." Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (quoting Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229, 230 (1972)). In response to the Supreme Court's criticism of the CDA, Congress incorporated into COPA this Miller test . . . . Even in so doing, Congress remained cognizant of the fact that "the application of community standards in the context of the Web is controversial." H.R. REP. N O. 107-775, at 28. Nevertheless, in defending the constitutionality of COPA's use of the Miller test, the government insists that "there is nothing dispositive about the fact that [in COPA] commercial distribution of such [harmful] materials occurs through an online, rather than a brick and mortar outlet." See Reply Brief at 18 n.3.
Despite the government's assertion, "[e]ach medium of expression 'must be assessed for First Amendment purposes by standards suited to it, for each may present its own problems.' " Reno III, 31 F. Supp.2d at 495 (quoting Southeastern Promotions, Ltd v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557 (1975)). In considering "the unique factors that affect communication in the new and technology-laden medium of the Web," we are convinced that there are crucial differences between a "brick and mortar outlet" and the online Web that dramatically affect a First Amendment analysis. Id.
Unlike a "brick and mortar outlet" with a specific geographic locale, and unlike the voluntary physical mailing of material from one geographic location to another, as in Miller, the uncontroverted facts indicate that the Web is not geographically constrained. Indeed, and of extreme significance, is the fact, as found by the District Court, that Web publishers are without any means to limit access to their sites based on the geographic location of particular Internet users.. . .This key difference necessarily affects our analysis in attempting to define what contemporary community standards should or could mean in a medium without geographic boundaries.
In expressing its concern over the wholly unprecedented broad coverage of the CDA's scope, the Supreme Court has already noted that because of the peculiar geography-free nature of cyberspace, a "community standards" test would essentially require every Web communication to abide by the most restrictive community's standards. See Reno II, 521 U.S. at 877-78. Similarly, to avoid liability under COPA, affected Web publishers would either need to severely censor their publications or implement an age or credit card verification system whereby any material that might be deemed harmful by the most puritan of communities in any state is shielded behind such a verification system. Shielding such vast amounts of material behind verification systems would prevent access to protected material by any adult seventeen or over without the necessary age verification credentials. Moreover, it would completely bar access to those materials to all minors under seventeen -- even if the material would not otherwise have been deemed "harmful" to them in their respective geographic communities.
The government argues that subjecting Web publishers to varying community standards is not constitutionally problematic or, for that matter, unusual. The government notes that there are numerous cases in which the courts have already subjected the same conduct to varying community standards, depending on the community in which the conduct occurred. . . .
These cases, however, are easily distinguished from the present case. In each of those cases, the defendants had the ability to control the distribution of controversial material with respect to the geographic communities into which they released it. Therefore, the defendants could limit their exposure to liability by avoiding those communities with particularly restrictive standards, while continuing to provide the controversial material in more liberal-minded communities. . . .
By contrast, Web publishers have no such comparable control. . . .
To minimize this distinction between Web publishers and all other forms of communication that contain material that is harmful to minors, the government cites . . . . United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701 (6th Cir. 1996). The Thomas court determined that whether the material on the defendant's electronic bulletin board is harmful must be judged by the standards of each individual community wherein the disputed material was received, even if the standards in each of the recipient communities varied one from the next, and even if the material was acceptable in the community from which it was sent. Despite the "electronic medium" in which electronic bulletin boards are found,Thomas is inapposite inasmuch as electronic bulletin boards, just as telephones, regular mail and other brick and mortar outlets, are very different creatures from that of the Web as a whole. Thomas itself recognized this difference, and by limiting its holding accordingly, completely undercuts the government's argument . . . .
Thus, it is clear that Thomas fails to support the government's position. Indeed, no federal court has yet ruled on whether the Web/Internet may be constitutionally regulated in light of differing community standards.
Our concern with COPA's adoption of Miller's "contemporary community standards" test by which to determine whether material is harmful to minors is with respect to its overbreadth in the context of the Web medium. Because no technology currently exists by which Web publishers may avoid liability, such publishers would necessarily be compelled to abide by the "standards of the community most likely to be offended by the message"Reno II, 521 U.S. at 877-78, even if the same material would not have been deemed harmful to minors in all other communities. Moreover, by restricting their publications to meet the more stringent standards of less liberal communities, adults whose constitutional rights permit them to view such materials would be unconstitutionally deprived of those rights. Thus, this result imposes an overreaching burden and restriction on constitutionally protected speech.n21
. . .[B]efore concluding that a statute is unconstitutionally overbroad, we seek to determine if the statute is " 'readily susceptible' to a narrowing construction that would make it constitutional . . . ." Virginia v. American Booksellers' Ass'n, 484 U.S. 383, 397 (1988).
Two possible ways to limit the interpretation of COPA are (a) assigning a narrow meaning to the language of the statute itself, or (b) deleting that portion of the statute that is unconstitutional, while preserving the remainder of the statute intact. We therefore turn our attention to whether either limiting construction is feasible here.
The government, in attempting to make use of the first of these salvaging mechanisms, suggests that we should interpret narrowly the "contemporary community standards" language in COPA as an "adult" rather than as a "geographic" standard. . . .
Despite the government's effort to salvage this clause of COPA from unconstitutionality, we have before us no evidence to suggest that adults everywhere in America would share the same standards for determining what is harmful to minors. To the contrary, it is significant to us that throughout case law, community standards have always been interpreted as a geographic standard without uniformity.
In fact, Miller, the very case from which the government derives its "community standards" concept, has made clear that community standards are to be construed in a localized geographic context. "People in different States vary in their tastes and attitudes and this diversity is not to be strangled by the absolutism of imposed uniformity." Miller, 413 U.S. at 33. . . . We therefore conclude that the interpretation of "contemporary community standards" is not "readily susceptible" to a narrowing construction of "adult" rather than "geographic" standard.
With respect to the second salvaging mechanism, . . . . if it is possible for a court to identify a particular part of the statute that is unconstitutional, and by striking only that language the court could leave the remainder of the statute intact and within the intent of Congress, courts should do so.
Here, however, striking "contemporary community standards" from COPA is not likely to succeed in salvaging COPA's constitutionality as this standard is an integral part of the statute, permeating and influencing the whole of the statute. . . .
Our foregoing discussion that under either approach-- of narrowing construction or deleting an unconstitutional element -- COPA is not "readily susceptible" to a construction that would make it constitutional. . . . As regulation under existing technology is unreasonable here, we conclude that with respect to this first prong of our preliminary injunction analysis, it is more likely than not that COPA will be found unconstitutional on the merits.
Our holding in no way ignores or questions the general applicability of the holding in Miller with respect to "contemporary community standards." We remain satisfied that Miller's "community standards" test continues to be a useful and viable tool in contexts other than the Internet and the Web under present technology. . . . Miller, however, has no applicability to the Internet and the Web, where Web publishers are currently without the ability to control the geographic scope of the recipients of their communications.
B. Irreparable Harm By Denial of Relief
. . . .
If a preliminary injunction were not to issue, COPA- affected Web publishers would most assuredly suffer irreparable harm -- the curtailment of their constitutionally protected right to free speech. . . . We, therefore, conclude that this element of our preliminary injunction analysis has been satisfied.
C. Injury Outweighs Harm
. . . COPA's threatened constraint on constitutionally protected free speech far outweighs the damage that would be imposed by our failure to affirm this preliminary injunction. We are also aware that without a preliminary injunction, Web publishers subject to COPA would immediately be required to censor constitutionally protected speech for adults, or incur substantial financial costs to implement COPA's affirmative defenses. Therefore, we affirm the District Court's holding that plaintiffs sufficiently met their burden in establishing this third prong of the preliminary injunction analysis.
D. Public Interest
. . . Curtailing constitutionally protected speech will not advance the public interest . . . Having met this final element of our preliminary injunction analysis, the District Court properly granted the ACLU's petition for a preliminary injunction.
Due to current technological limitations, COPA -- Congress' laudatory attempt to achieve its compelling objective of protecting minors from harmful material on the World Wide Web -- is more likely than not to be found unconstitutional as overbroad on the merits.n24 Because the ACLU has met its burden in establishing all four of the necessary elements to obtain a preliminary injunction, and the District Court properly exercised its discretion in issuing the preliminary injunction, we will affirm the District Court's order.
In so affirming, we . . . express our confidence and firm conviction that developing technology will soon render the "community standards" challenge moot, thereby making congressional regulation to protect minors from harmful material on the Web constitutionally practicable. Indeed, in the context of dealing with technology to prevent the "bleeding" of cable transmissions, the Supreme Court in United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 2000 WL 646196 at *4 (U.S. May 22, 2000) recognized, as do we, that "technology may one day provide another solution."
Therefore, we will affirm the District Court's order dated February 1, 1999, issuing a preliminary injunction.
2 For ease of reference the various applicable cases will be referred to as follows: ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996), hereinafter "Reno I" (addressing CDA); ACLU v. Reno, 521 U.S. 844 (1997), hereinafter "Reno II" (striking down the CDA as unconstitutional); ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473 (E.D. Pa. 1999), hereinafter "Reno III" (case currently on appeal addressing constitutionality of COPA).
6 In the House Report that accompanied the bill that eventually became COPA, this "harmful to minors" test attempts to conform to the standards identified by the Supreme Court in Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968), as modified by Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) in identifying "patently offensive" material.See H.R. REP. NO. 105-775, at 13 (1998).
7 Under COPA, a minor is defined as one under age seventeen. See 47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(7).
8 The defense also applies if an individual or entity attempts "in good faith to implement a defense" listed above. See id. 47 U.S.C. § 231(c)(2).
9 An individual found to have intentionally violated COPA also faces an additional fine of not more than $50,000 for each day of violation. See 47 U.S.C. § 231(a)(2).
16 We question, however, the effectiveness of actions taken by a minor's parent to supervise or block harmful material by using filtering software. We are of the view that such actions do not constitute government action, and we do not consider this to be a lesser restrictive means for the government to achieve its compelling interest. See also n.24 supra. But see United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 2000 WL 646196 (U.S. May 22, 2000).
18 The Supreme Court has recognized that each medium of expression may permit special justifications for regulation. For example, broadcast media, due to the history of extensive government regulation, its"invasive" nature, and the scarcity of available frequencies at its inception justified heightened regulation. However, the Supreme Court has also recognized that these same elements, which justified heightened regulation of the broadcast medium, do not exist in cyberspace. See ACLU v. Reno, 521 U.S. 844, 868 (1997). The Internet has not been historically subject to regulation. Nor has the Internet suffered from a scarcity of available frequencies. Therefore, the Supreme Court held that there is "no basis for qualifying the level of First Amendment scrutiny that should be applied to this [cyberspace] medium." Id. at 870.
19 As a result, we do not find it necessary to address the District Court's analysis of the definition of "commercial purposes"; whether the breadth of the forms of content covered by COPA could have been more narrowly tailored; whether the affirmative defenses impose too great a burden on Web publishers or whether those affirmative defenses should have been included as elements of the crime itself; whether COPA's inclusion of criminal as well as civil penalties was excessive; whether COPA is designed to include communications made in chat rooms, discussion groups and links to other Web sites; whether the government is entitled to so restrict communications when children will continue to be able to access foreign Web sites and other sources of material that is harmful to them; what taken "as a whole" should mean in the context of the Web and the Internet; or whether the statute's failure to distinguish between material that is harmful to a six year old versus a sixteen year old is problematic.
We recognize that in focusing on the "contemporary community standards" aspect of COPA we are affirming the District Court's ruling on a ground other than that emphasized by the District Court.
21 Even if we were to overlook the unconstitutional overbreadth of the COPA "contemporary community standards" test and if COPA were to be deemed effective, it still would not eliminate much of the harmful material which a minor could access. For example, minors could still access harmful material published by non-commercial Web publishers, and by foreign Web publishers. . . .
24 Although much attention at the District Court level was focused on the availability, virtues and effectiveness of voluntary blocking or filtering software that can enable parents to limit the harmful material to which their children may otherwise be exposed, the parental hand should not be looked to as a substitute for a congressional mandate. See also n.16 supra.
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